China was fully cognizant of the services rendered to her by the heroic army and navy of Japan in rooting out German power from Shantung. China was also deeply indebted to Great Britain for helping in this task at time of great peril to herself in Europe. China also was not forgetful of the services rendered her by the troops of the other Allies in Europe, which had held in check an enemy who might otherwise have easily sent reinforcement to the Far East and thereby prolonged hostilities there. China appreciated these services all the more because her people in Shantung had also suffered and sacrificed in connection with the military operations for the capture of Kiaochow, especially in regard to requisition for labor and supplies of all kinds.
     But, grateful as they were, the Chinese Delegation felt that they would be false to their duty to China and to the world if they did not object to paying their lots of gratitude by selling the birthright of their countrymen, and thereby sowing the seeds of discord for future. The Chinese Delegation therefore trusted that the conference, in considering the disposal of the leased territory and other rights held by Germany in Shantung, would give weight to the fundamental and transcendent rights of China, the rights of political sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to her earnest desire to serve the cause of universal peace.
     Baron Makinmo said that he had listened with great attention to what had fallen from his Chinese colleague concerning the direct restitution of Kiaochow to China. In the statement put forward on the previous day, he had explained the reason for which the Japanese Government had undertaken the reduction of this German stronghold.
     As the question to the restitution of the fortress had been raised, he thought it useful to read the words of the Japanese ultimatum to Germany, because it had a bearing on the purpose in hand:
“Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the agreement of the Alliance between Japan and Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asian, the establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:
     (1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men o war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.
     (2) To deliver on a date not later than the 15th September, 1914. To the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition and compensation the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to eventual restoration of the same China.”


     Since the occupation of Kiaochow, Japan had been in actual possession. In view of all that had passed between the Government of China and Japan, Baron Makino thought that China fully realized the import of Japanese occupation. The friendly interchange of views on this subject had been entered into, and Japan had agreed to restore Kiaochow as soon as Japan had free disposal of the place. Agreements had been reached with regard to the leased railways.
     As notes had been exchanged, he thought that a statement of these engagements might be worth the consideration of the members of the Council.
     President Wilson asked Baron Makino whether he proposed to lay these notes before the council.
     Baron Makino said that he did not think the Japanese Government would raise any objection, but as the request was an unexpected one, he would be compelled to ask its permission.
     President Wilson asked on before of China if Mr. Koo would do likewise.
     Mr. Koo said that Chinese Government had no objection to raise.
     M. Clemenceau asked both the Japanese and Chinese Delegates to state whether they would make known to the council the conditions of the restoration agreed between them.
     Baron Makino said that he would do so, provided his Government would make no objection. He did not think it would. If it were within his power, he would produce these documents as soon as possible. There was, however, one point he wished to make clear. Japan was in actual posse ssion of the territory under consideration. It had taken it by conquest from Germany.
     Before disposing of it to a third party, it was necessary that Japan should obtain the right of free disposal from Germany.
     President Wilson pointed out that the council was dealing with territories and cessions previously German without consulting Germany at all.
     Baron Makino said that the work now in hand was one of preparation for the presentation of the case to Germany. It followed therefore that the cession of Kiaochow would have to be agreed upon by Germany before it was carried out. What should take place thereafter had already been the subject of an interchange of views with China.
     Mr. Koo said that China did not quite the same view as Baron Makino regarding the restoration of Kiaochow. He was far from desiring, in his statement of China’s cases, even to intimate that Japan, after obtaining the leased territory and other rights in Shantung from Germany, would not return them to China. In fact, he added, China had every confidence in Japan’s assurance to her and the world that she, Japan, would not retain them herself; and he was particularly glad to hear Baron Makino confirm these assurances before the Conference. But there was a choice between direct and indirect restitution. Of the two China would prefer the first. It was always easier to take one step than two if it led to the same place.


As to the agreements referred to by the Plenipotentiary from Japan, Mr. Koo presumed that reference was to the treaties and notes made in consequence of the negotiations on the twenty-one demands in 1915. It was not necessary to describe in detail the circumstances which were, to say the least, disconcerting to the Chinese Government, as the latter was constrained to agree to them only after an ultimatum from Japan. Quite apart from the circumstances of their making, however, they were at best, in the view of the Chinese Government, only provisional cause they were questions arisen from the war.
     Furthermore, even if the treaties and notes had been entirely valid, the face of China’s declaration on Germany had altered the situation in such a way that on the principle of rebus sic stantibus they could not be enforced today. China had been made to agree with Germany on the disposition of Germany’s rights, privileges and concessions in Shantung. But the provision did not prelude China’s joining the war nor did it prevent China from participating in this Conference as a belligerent; nor could it therefore prelude her from demanding Germany direct restitution of her rights.
     Moreover, in her declaration of war against Germany, China expressly stated that all treaties and conventions concluded between China and Germany should be considered as nullified by the state of war between them. If then the leased convention had been so terminated, the leased territory of Kiaochow and such other rights and privileges enjoyed by Germany in Shantung had all reverted to China as the territorial sovereign.
     Even if the lease had not been terminated by China’s declaration of war, Germany would be incompetent to transfer it to any other power than China because of an express provision therein against transfer to another power.


叙述人称是第三人称，当时没有用讲稿

     （2）至迟在1914年9月15日，须无条件无补偿地把胶州全部租借地交给日本帝国政府，以便将其最后归还给中国。”
     自占领胶州后，日本事实上一直占据着这里，牧野男爵认为根据中日两国政府既已达成的所有协议，中国完全明白日本占据意味着什么。双方关于该问题已友好地交换了意见，并且日本已经同意一旦日本能自由处置胶州，就尽快将其归还中国。关于胶济铁路问题，也已达成若干协议。
     鉴于中日之间已经交换照会，顾维钧认为对中日的这些交涉作出声明，是值得“十人会”成员考虑的。
     顾维钧说在归还胶州问题上，中国与牧野男爵持不同的观点。他在关于中国问题的声明中，并不愿表明日本在从德国获得胶州租借地及其他权利后，不会把它们归还给中国。他又说，因为事实上中国完全信任日本对中国和世界的保证，即日本不会占据山东；而且他特别高兴地听到牧野男爵在大会上确认了这些保证。但是在直接和间接归还问题上存在着选择，中国宁愿采取第一个选择，即直接归还。如果两者的目标相同，一步到位总是较容易的。
至于日本全权代表所指的那些协议，顾维钧认为这应当是1915年因“二十一条”谈判所产生的若干条约和照会。没有必要对当时环境加以详细描述，说到底，中国政府是在日本最后通牒后于惊恐失措中被迫同意它们的。除了条约、照会当时产生的情境，在中国政府看来，它们充其量只是临时的、暂时性的协约，并将由这次大会的最后讨论来决定，因为它们都是大战所产生的问题。
     而且，即使这些条约和照会一直是完全有效的，中国对德宣战的事实根据情势变迁原则也已经改变了原来的形势，今天它们已经无须遵守。中国过去曾被迫同意她将完全认可日本与德国在山东的权利、特权和租借地等问题处理上所达成的任何安排。但是该规定没有排除中国加入大战，也没有阻止中国作为参战国参加此次和会；它也因而不能妨碍中国要求德国直接归还山东权利。
     更何况，中国在对德战争宣言中，已明确声明根据中德战争状态，两国间以往达成的所有条约和协定都视为无效。既然租借协定已被废除，那么作为领土主权完整，胶州租借地以及其他德国在山东享有的类似权利和特权都全部归还给了中国。
     即使租借条约不因中国的对德宣战而终止，德国也无权替代中国，将山东权利转交给其他强国，因为条约里已经就此作出了明确规定。


这是另外一个版本，显然是受电影影响杜撰的
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“（英语） 今天，我为我能有机会站在这里向世界表明中国的立场感到由衷的高兴。长久以来，中国人民期待着，期待着这个时刻的到来。因为，这是和平的大会，它不仅将给世界带来和平和公正，也将给中国带来和平和公正。我们怀着这样的期待和希望来到和会。 我们努力实现着我们渴望已久的梦想。但是，这绝不是一个虚无缥缈的梦想，因为，它是真实的。它是一块有着黄色土壤的中国领土，一条孕育着中国古老文化的河流抚育着它成长。在这块土地上，诞生过举世闻名的孔子和孟子，他们不仅对中国而且对世界的文明产生了极大的影响。在中国人的心里，它是神圣之地，中国文明的摇篮。它的名字叫山东！”
“（英语）众所周知，这片租借地，是德国用武力夺取的。鉴于和会接受的的民族自决与领土完整的原则，中国政府要求和会将德国战前在山东的租借地、铁路和其他一切权利归还中国！” “（英语）如果和会将这些领土转让给其他任何一个国家，这 无疑是对中国人民的极大侮辱！”
“（英语）中国不能失去山东，正如西方不能失去耶路撒冷一 样！山东是永远是中国的，她就象母亲的孩子，永远不会送给任何人！”
”……那么我倒想问问牧野男爵，你们日本在全世界面前偷盗了一个山东省，山东省的三千六百万人民，该不该愤怒呢？四万万中国人民该不该愤怒！请问日本的这个行为算不算是盗窃？是不是无耻？是不是极端的无耻！？”
顾维钧的这一番慷慨激昂的演讲，被西方疯狂报道。
今天，我将它重新搬上舞台，是为让我们不断努力，努力着在西方人面前展现出更强盛的一面！ 朝着日初的方向狂奔吧!

顾大才子

欢迎来到顾维钧吧~

@塔罗女 童鞋你快回来，我一人承受不来。。。。。

呵呵……我回来了……其实我在想……你也帮我管理一下这个吧呗……最个吧主怎么样？

@...天涯，赞赞赞！

楼主，请问有出处吗？最近急需顾维钧英文发言稿，可是网上没有免费资源，请问这个英文版出处是哪呀？

陈道明版本的顾维钧的两段演讲虽然明显不俗真的，但还是挺不错的。。
这个版本出处是。。？