韩国音乐市场的运营模式则不一样。订阅服务允许用户租听音乐，这项业务在韩国极其流行。只需支付9000韩元（8美元），爱好摇滚或流行音乐的用户就可以在一月内租听150首歌曲。音乐租听业务在2011年的销售额为4300亿韩元。
Alas for labels and artists, however, their payout is miserly. Under subscription deals, they collect as little as 30 won per track. This must then be split between performers, writers and the label itself. SM Entertainment’s boss complains that even 1m downloads cannot cover the cost of making a music video.
不过，唱片公司和歌手就悲剧了，他们从中获得的分红简直少得可怜。采取订阅销售模式，唱片公司和歌手每首歌只能收取30韩元。就这点钱还得在表演者、作词作曲者和唱片公司间进行再分配。SM公司老板就抱怨说，100万下载量收取的分红还不够歌曲制作费。
The fear of illegal downloading keeps the average price per track of digital music low. That the subscription-service operators are a powerful oligopoly further reduces the labels’ bargaining power. Thus, SM Entertainment took in a trifling 1.9 billion won in domestic digital sales in the first quarter of 2012. By contrast, the firm sold CDs worth 3 billion won, despite the physical format’s supposed demise.
为遏制非法下载，数码音源的价格被压得很低。而且租听服务运营商的垄断地位，进一步压缩了唱片公司的谈判空间。因此，SM公司2012年第一季度的音源收入才19亿韩元。形成鲜明对比的是，尽管相比数码音乐唱片会毁损老化，该公司的唱片销售额仍旧达到了30亿韩元。 SM Entertainment and other purveyors of K-pop cover this shortfall at home by having their stars hawk the latest phone, or appear on television variety shows. The biggest labels have become adept at squeezing cash out of their pop stars’ names, rather than their music. But only a handful of musicians are famous enough to benefit.
SM和其他公司通过让明星多上电视节目来弥补这块收入短板。这些最大的唱片公司已经变得善于利用偶像的名号圈钱，而非通过音乐本身赚取利润。不过，只有少部分明星有足够的名气让他们圈钱。
South Korea’s old business model, perfected by its carmakers, was to use a captive home market as a launch-pad from which to invade foreign shores. The country’s pop musicians have turned this model upside down: they have to export their tunes to make up for meagre pickings at home.
韩国传统的商业模式由现代汽车发展到极致，即先掌控国内市场，然后以此为跳板征服外国市场。而这个国家音乐人却将这个模式颠倒过来：只能通过音乐出口来补贴国内的微博收入。
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Alas for labels and artists, however, their payout is miserly. Under subscription deals, they collect as little as 30 won per track. This must then be split between performers, writers and the label itself. SM Entertainment’s boss complains that even 1m downloads cannot cover the cost of making a music video.
不过，唱片公司和歌手就悲剧了，他们从中获得的分红简直少得可怜。采取订阅销售模式，唱片公司和歌手每首歌只能收取30韩元。就这点钱还得在表演者、作词作曲者和唱片公司间进行再分配。SM公司老板就抱怨说，100万下载量收取的分红还不够歌曲制作费。
The fear of illegal downloading keeps the average price per track of digital music low. That the subscription-service operators are a powerful oligopoly further reduces the labels’ bargaining power. Thus, SM Entertainment took in a trifling 1.9 billion won in domestic digital sales in the first quarter of 2012. By contrast, the firm sold CDs worth 3 billion won, despite the physical format’s supposed demise.
为遏制非法下载，数码音源的价格被压得很低。而且租听服务运营商的垄断地位，进一步压缩了唱片公司的谈判空间。因此，SM公司2012年第一季度的音源收入才19亿韩元。形成鲜明对比的是，尽管相比数码音乐唱片会毁损老化，该公司的唱片销售额仍旧达到了30亿韩元。 SM Entertainment and other purveyors of K-pop cover this shortfall at home by having their stars hawk the latest phone, or appear on television variety shows. The biggest labels have become adept at squeezing cash out of their pop stars’ names, rather than their music. But only a handful of musicians are famous enough to benefit.
SM和其他公司通过让明星多上电视节目来弥补这块收入短板。这些最大的唱片公司已经变得善于利用偶像的名号圈钱，而非通过音乐本身赚取利润。不过，只有少部分明星有足够的名气让他们圈钱。
South Korea’s old business model, perfected by its carmakers, was to use a captive home market as a launch-pad from which to invade foreign shores. The country’s pop musicians have turned this model upside down: they have to export their tunes to make up for meagre pickings at home.
韩国传统的商业模式由现代汽车发展到极致，即先掌控国内市场，然后以此为跳板征服外国市场。而这个国家音乐人却将这个模式颠倒过来：只能通过音乐出口来补贴国内的微博收入。
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