责任一荣誉一国家。这三个神圣的名词庄严地提醒你应该成为怎样的人，可能成为怎样的人，一定要成为怎样的人。它们将使你精神振奋，在你似乎丧失勇气时鼓起勇气，似乎没有理由相信时重建信念，几乎绝望时产生希望。遗憾得很，我既没有雄辩的词令、诗意的想象，也没有华丽的隐喻向你们说明它们的意义。怀疑者一定要说它们只不过是几个名词，一句口号，一个浮夸的短词。每一个迂腐的学究，每一个蛊惑人心的政客，每一个玩世不恭的人，每一个伪君子，每一个惹是生非之徒，很遗憾，还有其他个性不甚正常的人，一定企图贬低它们，甚至对它们进行愚弄和嘲笑。

20年以后，在世界的另一边，他们又面对着黑黝黝肮脏的散兵坑、阴森森恶臭的战壕、湿淋淋污浊的坑道，还有那酷热的火辣辣的阳光、疾风狂暴的倾盆大雨、荒无人烟的丛林小道。他们忍受着与亲人长期分离的痛苦煎熬、热带疾病的猖獗蔓延、兵桌要地区的恐怖情景。他们坚定果敢的防御，他们迅速准确的攻击，他们不屈挠的目的，他们全面彻底的胜利——永恒的胜利——永远伴随着他们最后在血泊中的战斗。在战斗中，那些苍白憔悴的人们的目光始终庄严地跟随着责任一荣誉一国家的口号。

为了迎接所有这些巨大的变化与发展，你们的任务将变得更加坚定而不可侵犯，那就是赢得我们战争的胜利。你们的职业要求你们在这个生死关头勇于献身，此外别无所求。其余的一切公共目的、公共计划、公共需求，无论大小，都可以寻找其他办法去完成；而你们就是受训参加战斗的，你们的职业就是战斗——决心取胜。在战争中最明确的目标就是为了胜利，这是任何东西都代替不了的。假如你失败了，国家就要遭到破坏，因此，你的职业唯一要遵循的就是责任一荣誉一国家。其他人将纠缠于分散人们思想的国内外问题的争论，可是你将安详、宁静地屹立在远处，作为国家的卫士，作为国际矛盾怒潮中的救生员，作为硝烟弥漫的竞技场上的格斗士。

你们是联系我国防御系统全部机构的纽带。当战争警钟敲响时，从你们的队伍中将涌现出手操国家命运的伟大军官。还从来没有人打败过我们。假如你也是这样，上百万身穿橄榄色、棕色、蓝色和灰色制服的灵魂将从他们的白色十字架下站起来，以雷霆般的声音喊出那神奇的口号——责任一荣誉一国家。
这并不意味着你们是战争贩子。相反，高于众人之上的战士祈求和平，因为他忍受着战争最深刻的伤痛与疮疤。可是，我们的耳边经常响起那位大智大慧的哲学之父柏拉图的警世之言："只有死者才能看到战争的终结。"

我的生命已近黄昏，暮色已经降临，我昔日的风采和荣誉已经消失。它们随着对昔日事业的憧憬，带着那余晖消失了。昔日的记忆奇妙而美好，浸透了眼泪和昨日微笑的安慰和抚爱。我尽力但徒然地倾听，渴望听到军号吹奏起床导对那微弱而迷人的旋律，以及远处战鼓急促敲击的动人节奏。
我在梦幻中依稀又听到了大炮在轰鸣，又听到了滑膛枪在鸣放，又听到了战场上那陌生、哀愁的呻吟。
然而，晚年的回忆经常将我带回到西点军校。我的耳旁回响着，反复回响着：责任，荣誉，国家。
今天是我同你们进行的最后一次点名。但我愿你们知道，当我到达彼岸时，我最后想的是学员队，学员队，还是学员队。
我向大家告别。

老兵不死也在那年那兔那些事第三季第三集里。
下面放英文版。

General Macarthur Speech "Old soldiers never die they just fade away"
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker and distinguished members of the Congress:
I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride - humility in the wake of those great architects of our history who have stood here before me, pride in the reflection that this home of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised.
Here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race.

I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan considerations. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected.
I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.
I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country.

The issues are global, and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector oblivious to those of another is to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other.
There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism.

If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his efforts. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.
While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary --
(1) The intensification of our economic blockade against China.
(2) The imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.
(3) Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal area and of Manchuria.
(4) Removal of restrictions on the forces of the republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and to bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available.

I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some six hundred thousand men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.