BATTLES OF KASSERINE PASS & EL GUETTAR
凯赛林山口之战
Having receivedreinforcements in Tunisia, Rommel planned to attack the Americans first,whom he considered inexperienced, in order to rout them and thus have enoughtime to turn against his most dangerous foe: Montgomery’s battle-hardened EighthArmy. Therefore, he laid a trap for the American vanguard, composed ofthe 1st Armored Division supported by infantry combat groupsfrom BRO & 34th Infantry Division. In theissuing series of engagements fought between February 19th &24th, 1943, and known collectively as the “battle of Kasserine Pass“,the overconfident & overextended Americans were graced with a full display ofGerman Panzer skill: while having a slight advantage in numbers, theformer suffered about five times the losses in tanks & men they inflictedon the latter, and had to beat a hasty retreat. Although he would have liked topursue and finish them off, Rommel was confident he had accomplished hisobjective: teaching the Americans a lesson he was sure would take them long torecover, long enough for him to deal with his British arch-enemy.
得到突尼斯的援军后,隆美尔打算抢先攻击美军,因为他认为美军还十分缺乏作战经验,先对付美军能够争取到对付狡猾的蒙哥马利第八军的时间。因此,隆美尔给由大红一师和第34步兵师支援的第1装甲师前锋设下了一个埋伏。1943年2月19日至24日,一连串的交火后,凯赛林山口战役打响。过于自信和分散的美军遭遇了作战技巧高超的德国装甲部队:在数量上美军稍稍占优,但是美军损失的坦克和人员却是德军的五倍之多。因此,美军不得不仓皇撤退。尽管隆美尔很愿意追击撤退的美军,但是他自信的认为不追击也足以给美国人一个教训了,这个教训将给他赢得足够的时间,在美国人下次进攻前对付英国部队。
But as Winston Churchillonce put it: “You can always count on Americans to do the right thing –after they’ve tried everything else“. And at Kasserine, the Americansalmost tried everything that could have gone (and went) wrong at once: badleadership, bad communications, bad combined arms cooperation, overconfidence,overextended supply lines, … The disaster at Kasserine was the healthyelectroshock the US Army needed to “do the right thing”: to shake old habits,devise new tactics and training procedures, put a stronger emphasis oncommander’s initiative and replace WW1-minded officers with younger and moreenergic ones. As such, General Fredendall, commanding the US II.Corps during the battle was sent back home and replaced with GeorgePatton with Omar Bradley as his deputy. Not onlydid it take a much shorter time for the Americans to recover from thelesson they had been inflicted by Rommel than the latter had expected, but theywere soon to prove that they had actually been very studious pupils.
就像英国前首相温斯顿·丘吉尔所说:“你大可以指望美国人做出正确的事——在他们做了其他所有事情之后”。在凯赛林山口,美国人尝试了所有的错误办法:糟糕的领导、通讯、步坦协同,过于自信,过于分散的补给线等等。凯赛林山口的灾难恰恰成为了美国陆军逐渐成长的垫脚石:甩掉原来糟糕的习惯,开发新的战术和训练,强调指挥官的能动性,撤换还处在一战思维的军官,换上年轻的、更有活力的军官。为此,指挥美国第二军的Fredendall将军被送回了老家,接替他的是乔治·巴顿和奥马尔·布拉德雷。美军不仅比隆美尔预想的恢复时间快得多,他们还证明了自己是多么的勤奋好学。
One month afterKasserine, the reorganized II. Corps under Patton &Bradley was on the offensive again, advancing toward Bizerte. Von Arnim, whichhad replaced Rommel, opted for the same strategy: a violent assaultagainst the inexperienced Americans to put them out of combat quickly, thendeal with the “real” British threat. On March 23rd, about 50 tanks andsupporting infantry from 10. Panzerdivision emerged from ElGuettar valley and assaulted BRO. The first American lines werepushed back far enough for Allen’s HQ to be threatened by two German tanks, butwhen advised to evacuate, the general replied: “I will like hell pullout, and I’ll shoot the first bastard who does“. BRO lineswavered … yet did not break. The Germans soon ran into a minefield, while USreinforcements were brought into action, especially M10 Wolverineswhich engaged the German tanks. Three hours after initiating the battle,the Germans retreated, abandoning more than half their tanks behind them. Theylaunched another attack later in the day but were met with the same determinedresistance. BRO had won the day.
凯赛林之战一个月后,重组的美国第二军在巴顿和布莱德雷的指挥下重新发动了向Bizerte的进攻。接替隆美尔指挥的Von Arnim采用了和他前任相同的战术:迅猛的攻击没有经验的美军部队,然后趁美军退却之时对付真正的威胁英军。3月23日,德军第10装甲师麾下的50辆 坦 克和步兵从El Guettar山谷发动了向大红一师的攻击。美军战线迅速收缩,连Allen的指挥部前都遭遇了两辆德军 坦 克。当他被建议撤离时,Allen回答道“我不会撤退,我会向撤退的家伙开枪”。大红一师的战线风雨飘摇,但始终没有崩溃。德国人很快进入了雷区,装备了M10 坦 克 歼击车的美军增援部队也很快赶到。发动攻击3个小时后,德军撤退,抛弃了超过半数的坦克。德军在当天稍晚发动了另一次攻击,不过也被挫败了。大红一师获得了当天的胜利。
The campaign lagged onfor a more month before the last remaining Axis forces in Tunisia surrenderedon May 9th, 1943. By then, BRO had established a reputation asa reliable and efficient fighting force in combat. Its off-combat record wasn’tas prestigious though, the whole division having, according to Bradley, “assumedAllen’s cavalier attitude” and “left a trail of looted wine shops andoutraged mayors (…) in towns from Tunisia all the way toArzew“. One particular incident saw elements from the division “liberatingOran a second time”, this time from the US Army‘s own Servicesof Supply which was by then well-established in the city and hadthought wiser to close all their clubs and shops to the brawling andcelebrating combat troops.
战斗一直持续到突尼斯的轴心国部队最终在1943年5月9日投降。在那时,大红一师已经成为一支可靠和有效的战斗部队。不过战场之外的大红一师名声可不太好,根据布拉德雷的说法,“Allen的骑兵作风让大红一师在突尼斯的一路上留下了无数被劫掠过的酒庄和发怒的镇长”。特别值得一提的是部分大红一师的部队再次解放了Oran,这一次是从美军自己的后勤部队手中。因为这些后勤部队关闭了所有的士兵俱乐部和商店。